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Introduction:
In 1985, construction of what would soon be described as the “Wall of Shame”
began in the city of Lima. The wall is a barrier, about ten feet high that runs through four
municipalities. The wall is six miles long, made of concrete with barbed wire on the top,
and divides the wealthy and the poor residents of the city. More specifically, it segregates
the established elite of Lima from the residents that have migrated from rural areas of
Peru. In the 1980’s, a large number of migrants from rural Peru came to Lima seeking
refuge from the violence between the Maoist guerilla group the Shining Path and the
Peruvian government. The migrants would settle on the outskirts of the city, on
abandoned hillsides constructing mass informal settlements. A large majority of these
migrant refugees would travel to wealthy areas of Lima, such as Casuarinas, to find
employment, and ultimately new homes.
The response from the inhabitants of these wealthy communities was not one of
warm welcome, but rather rejection of the migrants. In fact, the construction of the wall
was instigated by a private academy in the Surco district as they began to surround their
property with tall fences. The school stated that they were taking precautionary security
measures in order to protect themselves from the migrant settlements. This began a trend
where several residents in Casuarinas began building their own wall, and little by little,
the wall began to grow in size and length. Many residents expanded the wall with
permission and help from local governments, but financed the construction themselves.
Some Casuarinas residents have justified the construction of the wall, as they claim that it
had lowered the crime rate in the neighborhood. Nonetheless, the wall has drawn
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comparisons with other barriers built to separate two social or ethnic groups such as the
Berlin Wall and the Northern Ireland “peace walls.”1
Lima’s Wall of Shame is not just a physical barrier enforcing class and race
segregation, but also a symbol of the social, political, and economic outcomes generated
by the growth of shantytowns on the outskirts of the city. Beginning in the 1950’s many
Latin American cities saw an increase in land invasions on the periphery of the city in
order to establish squatter settlements.2 In 1952, 14% of the Mexico City population lived
in these self-help settlements, which rose to 46% by 1966.3 The trend also applies to the
city of Lima. Historically, the shantytowns surrounding Lima existed prior to the large
wave of internal migration that occurred during the violence between the Shining Path
and the Peruvian government. History shows that a large amount of these shantytowns
began in the 1950’s, but later were integrated into the larger city of Lima as established
districts.4
While it does seem that Lima’s shantytowns did expand greatly in the 1950’s,
there are records showing that the construction of the shantytowns existed a few decades
prior. Anthropologist Jose Matos Mar published a 1955 study called, Estudio de Las
Barriadas de Lima, in which he compiled information about the shantytowns, which he
referred to as “barriadas.” He reports the first known formation of the barriadas in 1924,
with an exponential growth of barriadas beginning in the early 1950’s.5
1

Megan Janetsky, “Lima’s ‘Wall of Shame’ and the Art of Building Barrier,” The Atlantic Magazine,
September 7, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/09/peru-limawall/597085/.
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Alan Gilbert, The Latin American City (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1998), 83.
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Ibid., 82.
4
Bill Chambers, “The Barriadas of Lima: Slums or Hope or Despair? Problems or
Solution?” Geography 90 (2005): 200.
5
Jose Matos Mar, Estudio de las Barriadas Limeñas, (Lima: 1966), 20.
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Matos Mar described the formation of the barriadas as the result of internal
migration with certain national and local characteristics influencing their creation. He
listed these national characteristics including the rapid increase in the national population
of Peru; inadequate economic increase that did not provide enough jobs for the growing
population; rural inhabitants abandoning the idea of the small rural land owner; low
quality of life outside the city; migration from people who sought to go somewhere where
there more opportunities to succeed in life; and the rise of a centralized government,
which favors Lima as the center for opportunities as it is where the national government
is located, the economic center of Peru, and the largest development of industries.6 Local
characteristics included the limits to the economic development in Lima, which prevent
less-skilled laborers to succeed economically in the city, thus forcing them to create
housing on its outskirts; the lack of housing due to the 1940 earthquake or demolitions;
and politicians using the slums as a way to receive sympathy, which further encouraged
the creation of more slums.7
Despite Matos Mar’s theories of the origins of the barriadas in Lima, he also
noted that they were not unique to Peru. He states that there are many barriada
equivalents surrounding populated cities in many other Latin American countries such as:
“barrios hongos” in Chile; favelas in Brazil; cantegriles in Uruguay; barrios proletarios in
Mexico; villas miserias in Argentina; ranchos in Venezuela; and barrios brujos in
Panamá. Ultimately, what these shantytowns have in common is their creation through
internal migration. This is what occurred in Lima as in the 1960’s, migration was the
result of the 50% population growth in Lima, where about 75% of the population
6
7
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identified themselves as migrants. About 40% of the migrants were from the coastal
regions of the country, while about 50% were from the mountainous areas.8 Some of the
push factors included natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, forcing people to
move elsewhere. Rural poverty is also seen as a push factor that has resulted in people
wishing to move to Lima, a city where many see opportunity to succeed financially.9 The
large amount of migrants leaving the rural areas resulted in an improvement of man to
land ration, agricultural production, and living standards.10 Although, since the educated
population was more likely to migrate to Lima, the population left in the rural areas was
less likely to challenge the oligarchs in charge of them.11 This abuse from the oligarchs in
these rural towns created tensions that allowed the militia groups, like the Shining Path,
to take over towns like Ayacucho and begin their violent guerilla warfare against the
Peruvian government.12
Either way, the dramatic growth of the barriadas after 1950 points to the trend of a
large wave of migrants into Lima at that time. These settlements appeared to have a
similar amount of migrant men and women living in the barriadas. In the barriada City of
God in the 1950’s, 50% of its inhabitants were men, and 50% were women.13 Later,
within a few decades, the Wall of Shame highlighted the tensions created by a second
wave of migration that was impacted directly from the internal conflict during the 1980’s.
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The presence of the migrants resulted in inhabitants of Lima to allow a clear physical
division that would segregate the wealthy inhabitants and the poor shantytown dwellers.
It is also important to note that a part of the barriada population are of Indigenous
descent. Given the fact that Peru has historically marginalized these racial ethnic groups,
this paper seeks to discover if the racial makeup of the barriadas was a significant factor
in social outcomes for their inhabitants.
These dramatic changes raise the question of how to measure the impact of the
first wave of migration, that is, its significance for later urban outcomes. More
specifically, what were the political, economic, and social consequences of the first wave
on the urban landscape? Social impact refers to the influence of people of Indigenous
descent on the city of Lima. Were the actions of the people of Casuarinas rooted in a
previous sentiment that may have formed during the first wave of migration? This thesis
seeks to find the answer to these questions. Specifically, I will measure any economic
outcomes based on citywide impact the barriadas may have had on Lima. I will also
measure political outcomes through any government response towards the development
of the barriadas growth in government representation, size, infrastructure, and as social
centers. Finally, this paper will measure social outcomes via racial discrimination
reported by inhabitants of the barriadas; government discrimination; and physical
seperation due to the race of the barriadas inhabitants.
As the “Wall of Shame” reminds us, segregation of the poor and rich is a reality
in Peru that not only persists, but also shamefully public. Although practices of inequality
and racism have existed long before the twentieth century, the explosion of internal
migration and urbanization beginning in the mid-1900’s revealed new forms of these
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practices. Segregation and discrimination of the shantytown residents were new social
realities, but rooted in older sentiments. By investigating the rise of the barriadas between
1950 and 1980 as a recent expression of historical structures of inequality in Peru, I hope
to not just explain how the Wall of Shame came to be, but also to better understand
discrimination in Peru more broadly.

7

A map depicting the location of the barriadas in Lima in 1955. The barriadas are
highlighted in black.
Source: Jose Matos Mar, Estudio de las Barriadas Limeñas, (Lima: 1966).
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Political Impact of the Barriadas:
To track the relationship between the growing barriadas and politics in Peru, one
must first take a look at the political context during the first large wave of barriadas
during the mid-twentieth century. This will help explain why certain political figures
reacted to the barriadas in certain ways. Frank Andrews and George Phillips state that at
first, the government resisted the initial invasions, using the police to force out the
squatters. Eventually a relatively progressive national government began to accept the
existence of the barriadas. Starting in 1961, the Peruvian government halted in forcing
out the squatters and instead ordered the National Housing Authority to send planners
into the barriadas to help install utilities.14
What caused the Peruvian government to enact this type of policy in order to
address the barriadas? We must begin with President Manuel Odria, who was in power
from 1948 to 1956. In order to understand Odría’s involvement with the barriadas, one
must understand his opposition to the APRA political party. APRA was a reformist party
that faced opposition from Ordía when attempting to strengthen their base and political
power in the 1940’s. In 1948, APRA attempted a failed coup d’état against Ordía,
resulting in Ordía responding with arrests of APRA members and unions linked to the
poltical party. APRA had a strong base with the working and lower class, which resulted
in Ordía attempting to appeal to this demographic in order to, impede support for the
APRA and any similar groups that would oppose him.15 This explains the change in

14

Frank Andrews, et al., “The Squatters of Lima: Who They Are and What
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sentiment in these years towards acceptance of the barriadas, by recognizing them and
attempting to integrate them into the city of Lima.
Manuel Prado, a conservative, was elected president, following Odría from 1956
until 1962.16 Government officials began to realize, by 1956, that the barriadas
represented a large problem for Lima. While other slums, located inside the city of Lima,
had worse living conditions than barriadas, the squatter settlements were very visible and
publicly illegal.17 While the barriadas were located on the periphery of the urbanized and
heavily populated areas of the city, the callejónes, the most common type of slums in
Lima throughout the late twentieth century, were located inside the heavily populated and
urbanized area of Lima.18 Callejónes can be easily missed walking down the streets of
Lima as the only way to enter one is through a single door or passageway. After passing
the entrance, there is a large patio that is surrounded by rows of small dwellings. Unlike
the barriadas who own their invaded land, the residents of the Callejónes pay rent to live
in their homes.19 The callejónes pre-date the barriadas, since they were created in the late
nineteenth century for workers and migrants but were rented out to as low-income
housing in the early twentieth century. These slums often have a limited amount of utility
services, poor ventilation, and a dangerous amount of overcrowding.20 Nonetheless, the
barriadas reflected the government’s failure to address its largest city’s poverty,
disorganization, and unsanitary conditions in its housing settlements surrounding the city.

16
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Historically there has been a prejudice against the barriadas and their contribution
to Lima.21 In his 1958 report to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, José Matos Mar
stated that, “the common feature of all the barriadas is their instability. They are
unhealthy… low wages and highly inadequate living conditions have created problems of
health and nutrition…”22 Matos Mar clearly believed that the barriadas did not contribute
to the well-being of Lima, as they experienced its urbanization during this time period. In
fact, he states that the barriadas demonstrated, “a clear idea of the problem of
urbanization in Peru.”23
It was only a matter of time when the government would attempt to seriously
address the issue of the barriadas. The Prado administration appointed a commission that
studied the problems of the barriadas and published a report in 1958 with
recommendations on how the administration should address the settlements. The Prado
administration responded accordingly and passed Law 13517 on 1961.24 The law
addressed the issue of the barriadas by declaring the remodeling, sanitation, and
legalization of barriadas to be of public and national interest, and enacted the process to
transform the barriadas to popular urban centers of social interest. Remodeling meant to
adapt the barriada by equipping them with urban essentials. Sanitization meant installing
irrigation and drainage channels, eliminating waste, installing drinking water services,
constructing and improving traffic routes, and establishing public and private electric
lighting.
21
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Lastly, legalization meant recognizing a marginal neighborhood, which would
establish the legal situation with the owner of the land as well as the occupant established
on it. The law prohibited the creation of new barriadas, stating that any barriadas created
after the passing of this law wouldn’t be included in its plan to aid and urbanize them.
The National Housing Corporation was tasked with enforcing the provisions of the law.
The Peruvian government would provide, through the Housing Corporation, technical
direction, materials, and economic resources for the construction of the following
services: schools, medical posts, churches, parks, sports fields, civic centers, police
stations, job training centers, markets, craft workshops, domestic industry workshops,
trade centers, and industrial production centers.25
From these provisions of the law, it is clear that the Prado Administration was not
accepting the barriadas with open arms but instead attempting to get rid of them through
integrating the ones that currently exist into the urban areas of Lima and creating better
housing and living conditions in poorer areas so that squatter settlements would cease to
exist. The law was able to pass due to the congressional support from the APRA party
that supported the law due to their desire to pass legislation that promoted a solution for
the squatter settlements for the upcoming 1962 elections.26 Thus, the fact that the
barriadas were so publicly visible to the average Peruvian and were looked down upon,
helped alter the government’s actions on how to approach the squatter settlements.
Though the law was strongly supported by Prado and the military junta that
succeeded him, when Fernando Belaúde came to power in 1963, his administration halted
the progress to due lack of interest as well as budget cuts due to congressional
25
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opposition.27 In 1963, the National Housing Board (JNV) was created by the military
junta in charge before Belaúde to take the place of the National Housing Corporation.
Although the organization was autonomous, it lacked funds to help with the problem of
the barriadas, so they became dependent on congress. The JNV had the power to
recognize barriadas, decide how and which barriadas could be improved, as well as
which should be eradicated, and could also grant titles to land, promote massurbanization projects, and provide housing loans. Despite this, the JNV lacked the ability
to begin the majority of the projects due to budgetary constraints. Law 13517 allowed the
creation of low-cost suburban units in order to deter the creation of future barriadas, but
they were never constructed and thus new barriadas continued to form well after the
1960’s. In 1964, the JNV devised a plan to house the barriada inhabitants in flat land
close to the city owned by plantation owners and speculators. They asked congress to
expropriate the land, but congress did not want to raise taxes to do so and felt that the
money spent on this project could be better used elsewhere. President Belaunde did not
fight for the project, and adding insult to injury, the JNV’s payroll was also severely
cut.28 The large staff that had initiated the plan to move the barriada inhabitants into the
city now had few remaining members. Since 1965, the JNV has lacked the resources to
transform the barriadas despite having the legal power to do so.29
At the same time, we should also compare how the government reacted to the
needs of the barriada inhabitants versus what they actually desired. On April 1967, fifteen
Peruvian interviewers trained by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales por Muestro
27
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conducted a study on the residents of the barriadas using the population of the barriadas
in the Lima-Callao metropolitan area, as those recognized by the National Housing
Board.30 The survey had two goals: the first was to collect up-to-date information about
the barriadas and its inhabitants; and the second was to find out what the barriada
inhabitants believed they needed most for themselves and their communities.31 The
questionnaires asked the participants two types of questions about public and private
services: one that sought to find the extent of dissatisfaction with the services; and one
that sought to find how intense the dissatisfaction was.32 Many inhabitants had issues
with the location of medical services, the availability of property titles, access to water
and sewer systems.33 Nonetheless, the most widespread source of dissatisfaction,
according to the survey results, was the unpaved condition of the streets in the barriadas,
with 89% claiming to be dissatisfied with it. Many also had issue with the large presence
of dust that the unpaved roads provided.34
Regarding the services mentioned in the survey above, the Peruvian government
in the 1960’s did in fact address some of them. Lima powered its electricity using
hydroelectric and thermal plants at a time where many barriadas did not have electricity.
In 1965, forty-two barriadas were wired into the electrical system that powered Lima.35
The Empresas Eléctricas Asociadas (EEAA) supported the electrical demands of the city
and were dependent on utility charges. In the mid-1960’s the Tariff Commission, that
30
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determined the electricity rates, allowed EEAA to increase its rates.36 The general
household faced a five to twelve percent increase, while local and national government
organizations were provided lower rates. The EEAA gave the barriadas a special rate for
payment. The barriadas that don’t have electricity use candles, bottled gas, kerosene, and
lanterns. The EEAA did not make installations in barriadas without a land title because
they didn’t want to spend money on installations that may be declared illegal. When a
barriada secured their land title, they were the supplied with electricity.37
Concerning health services, the National Ministry of Public Health and Social
Welfare is responsible for the public health of Lima. In 1966, polio vaccinations were
distributed to children all throughout Lima, as well as the barriadas with 56 posts
established in the Callao barriadas.38 The Ministry expanded its area of health coverage
away from the center of urbanized Lima, to include the barriadas, which in result brings
more legitimacy to these settlements as a part of the city of Lima.
Regarding water supply and sewage, the city of Lima had not been prepared for
the population explosion that occurred in the twentieth century. While some institutions,
like electricity, were able to plan ahead and adjust, the water and sewage institutions did
not.39 By mid-1961, the two services were in terrible conditions. In 1963, a study of three
hundred and seventeen barriadas reported that only 2% had a piped water supply, and
56% did not have any type of water supply. 40 In 1962, the newly formed military junta
created the Lima Water and Sewage Corporation (COSAL), a state corporation that was
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given public and private funding for projects that would allow it to serve the population
of Lima that lived in the most urbanized area.41 For the most part, the barriadas were not
included in COSAL’s area of coverage and even those who pressured the organization to
include them in their coverage didn’t always recieve installation of street facilities. Due
to lack of money, the barriadas were not helped by COSAL and instead had to construct
the local sewage systems themselves. The National Housing Board helped fund the
construction of pipes in two barriadas as it was their responsibility to provide this service
to the barriadas. Yet, they lacked the funds to do so successfully in all of them. The
barriada members that didn’t have these systems installed instead bought water from
water trucks, and used the street, irrigation ditches, and outhouses for sewage.42
Concerning transportation, the survival of the barriadas was heavily dependent on
the bus service of Lima.43 The poor bus service in Peru was the result of its lack of profit.
The bus companies and the government refused to raise the transportation rates with
discounted rates given to students, workers, and uniformed soldiers. The regular rate of
the bus line was 8.2 cents in the mid-1960’s. Barriada routes were also given a discount,
charging only 6 cents.44 This discount may be due to the fact that the barriada members
tended to be a part of the lower class of Lima, and the lower rate would provide more
incentive for the barriada members to ride the bus. Whatever the reason, the presence of
the barriadas were able to affect the cost of the transportation, most likely to convenience
them. The Lima Provincial Council (CPL) also constructed several public road projects
from 1964-1966. One was the Perú Avenue, located at the center of the barriada San
41

Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 116.
43
Ibid., 122.
44
Ibid., 123.
42

16

Martín de Porras. Funded by the CPL, this was the most well contructed street in any
barriada. The CPL also extended the Aviación Avenue into one of the worst crime
centers in Lima.45 The CPL was attempting to help urbanize and connect poorer areas of
Lima to the rest of the city, including the barriadas.
When comparing the 1967 survey and the reality of government involvement with
the public services in the barriadas during this time, it appears that there were some
attempts to genuinely address the needs of the barriada members. The largest complaint
of the barriada members – the unpaved roads – was somewhat addressed by the CPL,
which did end up constructing some roads to the barriadas, but the largest project during
that time period was Paseo de la República Project, which was designed to carry large
amounts of traffic from down-town Lima south to Miraflores,46 The CPL were placing
more focus on expanding urbanization to upscale areas like Miraflores, rather than
focusing on the more underdeveloped barriadas. In the 1960’s, the Peruvian government
attempted the bare minimum to try and uplift the barriadas, not out of altruistic motives
but rather for political gain or shame of their existence. Thus, what resulted were many
efforts to attempt to urbanize and integrate the barriadas into Lima, but no funds or
dedication to complete the task.

Economic Impact of the Barriadas:
The common view about the barriadas in the early to mid-twentieth century was
that they were filled with supposedly uneducated and unmotivated migrant Indians from
the rural areas of Peru; that they were an economic burden on the city of Lima; and
45
46
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finally, that they were a breeding ground for radical ideologies potentially threatening the
Peru state. Anthropologist William Mangin noted that this was a false stereotype of the
barriadas. Specifically, he disagreed with the concept that the barriadas were an economic
burden on the city of Lima.47 Instead, Mangin argued that the existence of squatter
settlements throughout Latin America have helped solve the problem of low-cost housing
to shelter a booming population.48 This sentiment had become the newly accepted norm
in scholarly journals.
In a 1958 report to the UN titled, “Migration and Urbanization – The ‘Barriadas’
of Lima,” Anthropologist José Matos’ reported that the barriadas were unstable due to its
inhabitants’ “backwardness,” and “unhealthy” manner of living and inability to help
Lima modernize. He stated that the migrants increased the large amount of unskilled
labor that was already available in Lima, which in turn prevented efforts to improve
working and living conditions.49 He criticized their presence as a burden for the city, as
their low wages and poor living conditions would contribute to its problems of health and
nutrition.50
In 1974, Anthropologist Robert Weller contested the proposed idea that migrants
moving to Lima were lowering the socio-economic levels. In his article, “The Structural
Assimilation of In-Migrants to Lima, Peru” he stated that there is not enough data to state
that the massive influx of in-migrants is drastically lowering the socio-economic levels in
Lima. Thus, he concluded that the lowering of the socio-economic levels must be due to
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the inability of the government to provide socially adequate services.51 Weller’s article
disputes Matos Mars’ assumptions that the migrants living in the barriadas were part of
the problem in lowering the quality of life for the rest of Lima’s inhabitants. Instead of
placing blame on the migrants, he places the blame on the Peruvian government.
Providing another view, geographer Bill Chambers argued in 2005 that that the
barriadas were not a burden on the city as other scholars may have suggested, but rather
catalysts that can help restructure the city of Lima.52 He stated that there were many
services that developed in the barriadas, such as small local industries and
transportation.53 The barriadas were positive for Lima’s economic advancement because
they provided housing for millions of homeless people, employed its inhabitants, and
enhanced the real estate of Lima, much like what Mangin believed.54 Historian David
Soll agreed with this sentiment in his article, “Healthy Country, Unhealthy City:
Population Growth, Migration, and Urban Sanitation in Lima and Manila.” He stated that
the large number of migrants arriving in Lima, and the incompetence of the government,
was the reason the barriadas were created and were maintained for decades with a low
quality of life.55 Yet, he believed that the “barriadas” contributed to urbanization as the
people of the settlements began to create their own communities and jobs. This in turn
eventually resulted in the rise of modern democracy, which would eventually create a
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better quality of life for the people of the barriadas.56 Economist Hernando de Soto
believed that excessive governmental bureaucracy and a system that allows business and
government elites to manipulate the system to their advantage results in
underdevelopment. Thus, he praised informal means of establishing housing and
providing services.57 De Soto thought that these informal economic activities contributed
heavily to the national economy.58
The consensus that the barriadas raised the quality of a city can be measured by
its economic impact through a few different factors. Mangin believed that the squatter
settlements in Latin America made four kinds of contributions to the national economy:
land improvement and housing, contribution to the job market, the growth of small
business in squatter settlements, and “intangible social capital invested in the creation of
a community.”59 As stated earlier, the creation of the barriadas improved the barren and
abandoned land on the periphery of the city.60 Since the barriada residents own the land,
they don’t have to pay rent and can thus invest any excess money into construction
projects inside the settlements that can last up to ten years to finish.61 By using up this
previously unused land, the barriada inhabitants help expand the city of Lima and build
and expand their own houses. While at first the houses were made of straw, as soon as the
inhabitants collected enough money, they upgraded to a house made of brick and
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cement.62 Mangin’s next point was that the squatter settlements contributed to the job
market, by either providing jobs for the residents themselves or providing workers for
certain occupations inside the city. Despite the stereotype of the low-income worker from
the barriada, Mangin states that these residents in Lima have several middle-class
occupations such as teachers and lawyers. In fact, the barriada Pampa de Comas had a
doctor, police lieutenant, and a lawyer in their local club.63
If I were to compare the income and occupations of an average barriada inhabitant
and an inhabitant of metropolitan Lima, it becomes clear that they make similar
contributions to the Peruvian economy. In 1956, the average income of individuals living
in the barriadas was about 87% of the average wage in Lima, and in 1958 it was 74%. In
1956 the average household income in the barriadas was 120% of the average household
in Lima, 85% in 1961-1962, and 114% in 1967.64 While the average barriada resident
made less than the average metropolitan resident, they are not significantly lower and
their averages in households fluctuates between making less than the metropolitan family
and making more.
The resident in the two areas also appear to work in similar occupations. Between
1958 and 1959, the barriada industry of employment with the highest percentage was in
manufacturing with 33.62%, with construction in second place at 18.25%, and commerce
in third with 17.84%. In 1961, the metropolitan Lima industry of employment with the
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highest percentage was services at 32.29%, with manufacturing in second place at
23.04%, and commerce at third at 18.10%.65
There was also an increase in average income for the average barriada household
from the 1950’s to the 1960’s. The average income of the barriada households in 1956
was $56.78 a month, in 1961-962 it was $50.70 a month, and in 1967 it was $75.81 a
month.66 The average wage increased in Lima by 25%, which can explain the rise in the
wages received by families in the barriadas throughout these years.67 This also shows
how connected the average barriada household is to the economy of Lima. This
contradicts any previous notions of the barriadas as poverty-stricken slums that are only a
financial burden to the city of Lima. In fact, the barriada residents’ contribution to the
Peruvian economy is similar to the contribution of the average inhabitant of metropolitan
Lima, and they also provide many other economic contributions to the city.

Social Impact of the Barriadas:
There is an aspect of historical context necessary to understand both the
experiences and outcomes of the barriadas in Lima: the racial ethnic identities of their
inhabitants. As stated before, a large portion of the migrants that created the barriadas
were from the mountainous areas of Peru. In the late 1960’s, the largest racial identity in
the mountainous areas of Peru was Indian, with the economic life dominated by
mestizos.68 The 1940 census in Peru reported that 53% identified as white or mestizo,
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46% of the population identified as Indian, 0.68% identified from an Oriental
background, and 0.47% identified as “Negroes.”69 In his address to the UN in 1958, Jose
Matos Mar referred to the people who inhabit the barriadas as “urban mestizos” and a
part of the “Indian” community.70 Thus, a portion of the population of the barriadas, may
be seen as Indigenous, an ethnic identity that has historically been marginalized in Peru.
During Peru’s colonial era, the Spaniards created the casta (caste system) to
promote a racialized socioeconomic hierarchy. This system separated people into
different classes by their intersecting race and class identities. The elite class was
comprised of Christians of European descent, and below them in social status were
various categories including mestizos, that is, people of mixed Indigenous and European
parentage. The next lowest strata consisted of “mulattos,” people of mixed European and
African descent or appearance. The “pure” Indigenous and Afrodescended people, were
the lowest two groups in this racial hierarchy.71 The Spaniards used this casta system in
order to identify and force people of Indigenous descent into a forced labor draft, known
as the mita. The Inca rulers had previously created the mita in order to force their subjects
to construct projects for the empire. The Spaniards continued the use of the mita after the
fall of the Inca Empire, as a way to force the Indigenous to work in the silver mines for
no pay.72 Not only was the racism established in the colonial era spread by the colonizers,
it was internalized as truth by the colonized. This helped strengthen the colonial order
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established by the colonizers. The fall of the Túpac Amaru II rebellion, which attempted
to unify the traditionally isolated and heterogeneous indigenous population, opened the
door to the deterioration of the condition of the Indigenous Peruvians.73 By the twentieth
century, the term Indian had become synonymous with “campesino,” which meant
peasant farmer, and poor. This helped push the narrative of the “natural inferiority” of the
Indian, as they were now always presented as poor.74
For the most part, modern Peru consists of two groups, mestizo and Indian.
Although the term mestizo traditionally refers to people of mixed European and Indian
descent, cultural characteristics, such as clothing and language, was mainly what labeled
someone as a mestizo or Indian.75 Indians are at the bottom of the social structure, who
mainly speak their native language of Quechua or Aymara and wear Indian clothing. The
Indigenous are often found in the mountainous areas of Peru, mainly in farming villages.
Mestizos, on the other hand, occupy mainly the middle of the social structure,
predominantly speaking Spanish and wearing western clothing. In Lima, the mestizos are
the largest group in Lima and occupy the middle and sometimes upper-strata of the social
structure in the city.76 Thus, with this context presented, it becomes clearer as to why the
residents of metropolitan Lima view the barriadas, which have a noticeable Indian
population, a certain way.
The casta system was officially eradicated after Peru gained its independence,
however, its impact on Peruvian society continued to leave its mark centuries later.
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Exploitation of mestizos and the Indigenous continued into the twentieth century. In
1969, the Peruvian junta leader Juan Velasco Alvarado gave a speech titled, “Message to
the Nation on Agrarian Reform.” In the speech he states that he is tired of Peruvian
society treating the Indigenous population as second-class citizens, and exploiting them.
His solution was to pass an agrarian reform that would uplift the Indigenous population
by giving them the land that they work on, and freeing them of any exploitation. 77
Historian Neslon Manrique has also stated that discrimination against the Indigenous and
mestizos was still well and alive in Peru throughout the twentieth century. He believed
that the most important element in understanding the social crisis in Peru was the
persistence of ethnic and racial discrimination. When referring to the “social crisis,”
Manrique meant to the social tensions that have occurred over the past decades
throughout Lima that has resulted in violence, such as the emergence of the Shining
Path.78 Thus, the legacy of the casta system clearly left its mark on modern Peruvian
politics.
William Mangin noted that the barriadas were often viewed as the “centers of
illness, vice, crime, family disorganization, child neglect, communism, radicalism,
anarchy, resistance to progress, and that these conditions are mainly due to migration.”79
In the UN report, Matos Mar heavily criticized the existence of the barriadas because he
believed that they were increasing the already large amount of unskilled laborers, which
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prevented the improvement of living and working conditions.80 He also stated that the
arrival of the migrants resulted in these settlements that lack public amenities, which
impedes progress for the city and that they also create health and nutrition problems
because of the low wages they make and their poor living conditions.81 Mangin stated
that his analysis of police records from the barriadas doesn’t reflect this perceived reality
of a dangerous barriada with higher crime rates. He used his experiences in Peru in the
1960’s, including his conversations with physicians, and observations in hospitals, to
come to the conclusion that the barriadas most likely did not have a significantly lower
rate of sickness than other lower class areas in the city.82 Nonetheless, the general
perception from the rest of the city viewed the barriadas as “invaders” who were an
economic and social threat to them as well as deteriorating their economic, social, and
political resources.83
As the barriadas are highly visible in the city of Lima and have the reputation of
being largely inhabited by Indigenous people, the Peruvian government may have kept
this in mind when implementing their policies for the integration of the barriadas into the
rest of metropolitan Lima. Famous Peruvian writer and political figure Mario Vargas
Llosa related to this sentiment. He once wrote in a 1990’s Harper’s article that
Indian peasants live in such a primitive way that communication is practically
impossible. It is only when they move to the cities that they have the opportunity
to mingle with the other Peru. The price they must pay for integration is high–
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renunciation of their culture, their language; their beliefs, their traditions and
customs, and the adoption of the culture of their ancient masters. After one
generation they become mestizos. They are no longer Indians.84
Unlike like Nelson Manrique, Vargas Llosa believed that the Indigenous population and
their customs were hindering Peru’s progress into a modernized world.85 From this quote,
it becomes clear that he believed that proper way to address the Indigenous was not to
respect their culture but to attempt to eradicate it and transform them into modern
mestizos. It would be through this process that Peru could become a more modernized
country.
This sentiment was commonly reflected in the Indigenous inhabitants of the
barriadas. The representation of Indian culture through their clothes, language, and
appearance, “indicated backwardness and ‘Indianness’” was heavily disliked and feared
by the Lima residents.86 While the parents in the barriadas tend to work low level and low
paying occupations, they aspired for their children to work more professional jobs.
Children were encouraged to aspire to be a modern national Peruvian, a rejection of
Indian and Quechua culture. A late twentieth century national “modern” Peruvian did not
follow in the footsteps of Creole Colonial Spanish tradition, but rather a modernized
western culture similar to twentieth century New York and Paris.87
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The Velasco Administration also reflected this sentiment, although in a different
form. While Velasco had passed the Agrarian Reform in the late 1960’s to uplift the
Indigenous population to help modernize Peru, he was also attempting to erase the label
of the Indian community by referring to them as the “Peasant Communities.”88 In fact he
had even erased the word “Indian” from Peru’s official vocabulary.89 Velasco’s
government was attempting to erase the concept of the Indigenous and attempting to
unite their identity with the rest of the ethnic groups in Peru to create one “Peasant
Community.” While attempting to uplift the actual Indigenous population, it becomes
clear that Velasco wanted to erase their identity, which could be made possible by
modernizing them in the way described by Vargas Llosa. Thus, it becomes increasingly
clear that the national government’s attempt to eradicate and integrate the barriadas
accomplished two goals: hide the visible poverty of Lima and integrate the Indigenous
population into mestizos.
Although it is important to note that the country of Peru would promote
Indigenous customs as the face of Peru’s social culture, while rejecting the actual
Indigenous population. In the 1950’s in Cuzco, mestizos would often create physical
separation from “cholos” or “cholo mestizos” in public areas, with the term cholo
referring to the Indigenous population that had not shed their Indigenous habits and
culture.90 By the 1970’s, many Indigenous people began to reject their Indian social
identity due to the social condemnation of their culture as a detriment to the progress of
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Peru.91 Yet, as tourism grew in Cuzco in the twentieth century, the image of the “festive
Indian” crafted by the neoindigenistas became a magnet in attracting foreign visitors. The
festive Indian placed less emphasis on the concept of image on the illiterate peasant and
more on their instinctive musical and choreographic abilities. Neoindigenistas in Cuzco
would supervise and authorize which Indigenous art would be placed on display to
represent Cuzco culture. Ultimately, the festive Indian became the symbol of the
revitalization of regional culture.92 Although cities like Cuzco used the Indigenous
population as a cultural face to attract tourism, many Peruvians continued to reject the
actual Indigenous people. This contradictory attitude was evident not just in tourist
centers but also more widely in Peru and other Latin American countries.93

Conclusion:
As the country of Peru exploded in population in the mid-twentieth century, only
the determination of city dwellers looking for a better place to live created the barriadas,
without much help from the state. The Peruvian government’s lack of ability to provide
sufficient housing in Lima created conditions for the growth of squatter settlements,
similar to many other cities throughout Latin America in the twentieth century. The
barriada settlements, initially appearing fairly far removed from the city center, had a
large impact on Lima politically, economically, and socially. Despite the national
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government initially ignoring the settlements, their public visibility resulted in official
attempts to hide them from the rest of the world.
The barriadas were seen as an embarrassment to Peru. They raised questions
about the nation’s ability to modernize and provide a respectable quality of life for those
who migrated to the city. Despite the fact that the barriadas helped support the city of
Lima in various ways, such as providing housing for the low-income residents and
contributing to the labor demands of the city, they were still seen as an urban blemish.
This sentiment was aided by the fact that, to the average Lima resident, the Indigenous
population were the faces of the barriadas. This historically exploited and oppressed
ethnic group had still not been seen with respect by metropolitan Lima by the mid-to-late
twentieth century. In a city that was attempting to modernize and progress, the
Indigenous population represented regression. Thus, the Peruvian government attempted
to hide their “shameful secret” of the barriadas.
My analysis of the growth and impact of Lima’s barriadas concludes in 1980, and
thus does not mention the large increase of squatter settlements following the Peruvian
government’s internal conflict with the Shining Path in the years that followed. Yet, the
Wall of Shame shows the continuity of this sentiment of hiding the nation’s
disadvantaged citizens in the barriadas. The attempts to obscure those citizens’ poverty
also obscured lived aspects of Indigenous culture. For the wealthy residents of
Casuarinas, the wall is a way to ignore the barriadas. Despite the houses piling up on the
dirt hills, the wealthy residents of Lima – who benefit from the low-wage labor of urban
migrants – would rather ignore the structures of inequality that have plagued their city for
decades, if not centuries.
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